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Crisis, Charisma, and Consequences: Evidence from
the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election
Jennifer L. Merolla Claremont Graduate University
Jennifer M. Ramos University of California, Davis
Elizabeth J. Zechmeister University of California, Davis
We investigate how conditions of crisis affect perceptions of charisma and how these, in turn, affect blame attribution
and self-sacrificial behavior. Our data are from a 2004 experimental study that preceded the U.S. presidential
election, in which we manipulated concerns of a terrorist attack. The results show that those in the Crisis condition
rated Bush higher on perceptions of charisma compared to those in the Good Times condition. The Crisis condition
also directly and indirectly, via perceptions of charisma, affected whether Bush was blamed for failures in Iraq and
our subjects’ willingness to sacrifice their personal resources for his candidacy.
Terrorist attacks, health scares, and economicrecessions make us vividly aware of citizens’vulnerability to crises. Under conditions in
which crises loom or have been realized, citizens’
perceptions of leaders often shift, affecting their
attitudes and their behaviors. Our paper focuses on
one particular factor, albeit a controversial one, that
we believe is influenced by crises: charismatic
leadership. Deep national crises often coincide with
the rise of highly charismatic leaders, such as Juan
Perón and Adolf Hitler. Yet even in less extreme con-
ditions, we assert that political leaders can come to
be seen as more charismatic; and, these increased
perceptions of charisma carry important political
consequences.
Our argument is based in extant scholarship,
which suggests that perceptions of charisma can be
magnified by contextual circumstances and that these
heightened perceptions can provide likely leaders
with special purchase (e.g., Madsen and Snow 1991;
Weber 1922, 1947). We focus on three particular
questions: Do crises affect citizens’ perceptions of
the charisma of political leaders? Do charismatic
politicians better avert blame? And, finally, do such
politicians evoke greater levels of self-sacrificial
behavior?
Generally speaking, political scientists have been
hesitant to pursue, and a few have even argued against,
the study of charisma (e.g., Spinrad 1991). Some of
this disinclination may stem from the seemingly
elusive nature of charisma. Reactions to the term are
often akin to Justice Potter Stewart’s famous statement
on obscene material, which suggested that it is hard to
define but “I know it when I see it.”1 Nevertheless, not
only do members of the press and campaign opera-
tives extol the importance of charisma, but many
scholars outside the purview of political science have
embraced charisma and transformed it into a theoreti-
cally grounded, empirically valid, and measurable
concept. Moreover, several researchers have offered
persuasive accounts of the role charisma plays in the
success of certain political leaders (e.g., Davies 1954;
Friedrich 1961; Madsen and Snow 1991; Willner 1984)
and in voting behavior (Pillai and Williams 1998; Pillai
et al. 2003; but see McCann 1997). Our project
expands and extends this research by using an experi-
mental setting to investigate the intersection of crisis,
charisma, and consequences.
1Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
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A Theory of Crisis, Charisma, and
Consequences
Frequent references to the term “charisma” in the
popular press suggest that the public possesses some
general sense of what it is and that it is important.2
But, what is charisma exactly, when is it important,
and what consequences does it have for political
behavior? In this section we argue, first, that condi-
tions of crisis heighten perceptions of a leader’s cha-
risma. Second, these factors (crises and charisma) lead
individuals to overlook poor performance by that
leader and to express a willingness to engage in self-
sacrificial behavior on his or her behalf. Before devel-
oping this two-part argument, we first provide a
working definition of charisma.
Charisma
Beginning with Weber’s (1922, 1947) classic work,
scholars have theorized about charismatic leadership
from a variety of disciplinary perspectives. Two basic
understandings of charisma stand out in current aca-
demic and popular texts. The first stems from Weber’s
definition of charisma as “a certain quality of an indi-
vidual personality by virtue of which he is set apart
from ordinary men and treated as endowed with
supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically
exceptional qualities” (quoted in Eisenstadt 1968,
xviii). In this conception, leaders are, or are not, inher-
ently charismatic. If we look at charisma in this way, it
is an elusive or at least ambiguous concept. How can
we determine whether a leader is “superhuman”?3
We adhere to a second, more concrete definition
of charisma characterized by three principal features.
First, charisma is a continuous latent construct
derived from a bundle of specific traits and, as such,
something that one can possess to greater or lesser
degrees. Conceptualizations and operationalizations
of charisma that follow this format are nearly ubiqui-
tous in the study of organizational leadership and have
been increasingly adopted by studies of charisma in
the political realm (e.g., Bligh, Kohles, and Pillai 2005;
Emrich et al. 2001; Pillai and Williams 1998; Pillai
et al. 2003; Shamir 1994).4 Among scholars working in
this tradition, a great deal of agreement exists with
respect to the core elements of the bundle of traits that
make a leader more charismatic; specifically, greater
levels of charisma are associated with being more con-
fident, caring, enthusiastic, goal-oriented, optimistic,
and inspiring (e.g., Behling and McFillen 1996;
Bryman 1992; Conger and Kanungo 1988; House and
Howell 1992; Madsen and Snow 1991).
Second, charisma is not simply an inherent per-
sonality trait. While individuals may innately possess
(or fail to possess) certain traits associated with cha-
risma, the degree to which they are ultimately per-
ceived as charismatic can be influenced by contextual
circumstances. In short, charisma is intrinsically
linked to follower perceptions (Conger, Kanungo, and
Menon 2000) and, as such, is malleable. One context in
which followers may come to perceive leaders as more
charismatic is during times of crisis.5
Third, charisma is associated with a particular
type of leadership and is not simply another term for
general leadership. Scholars (e.g., Avolio, Waldman,
and Einstein 1988; Bass 1985; Hunt, Boal, and Dodge
1999) identify several different types of leadership,
including transformational, active transactional,
passive transactional, and laissez-faire, which are
based on different leader-follower relationships. For
example, a passive transactional leader only interferes
with the status quo when a problem arises (Avolio,
Waldman, and Einstein 1988). Charismatic attributes
are at the heart of the transformational leader, who, by
means of these qualities, elicits trust and loyalty from
followers (Bass 1985; Pillai and Williams 1998). For
our purposes, the key point is that these various lead-
ership types have been shown to evoke distinct behav-
ioral responses on the part of followers (e.g., Avolio,
Waldman, and Einstein 1988; Awamleh and Gardner
1999; Bass and Avolio 1994; Conger, Kanungo, and
Menon 2000; Hunt, Boal, and Dodge 1999).
Crises
The first part of our two-part argument is that condi-
tions of crisis affect the extent to which a particular
2In a search of the New York Times online archive from January 1,
1981, to December 31, 2005, the phrase “charismatic leader” yields
330 results. For the purposes of comparison, “strong leader,”
“moral leader,” and “intelligent leader,” respectively, generate 513,
77, and 11 hits.
3The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary offers a similar defini-
tion of charisma: “a personal magic of leadership arousing special
popular loyalty or enthusiasm for a public figure (as a political
figure).” Available at http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/charisma.
4They are also found in the popular press; a search of the New York
Times archive from January 1, 1981, to December 31, 2005,
revealed a total of 88 hits for the phrase “more charismatic” and 31
hits for the phrase “less charismatic.”
5Studies have also demonstrated that perceptions of charisma can
be influenced by personal efforts to adopt more charismatic char-
acteristics (e.g., Cohen 1992) and by the nature of the leader’s
performance in office (e.g., Shamir and Howell 1999).
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leader is perceived to be charismatic; more specifically,
crises magnify perceptions of charisma. Crisis situa-
tions evoke feelings of distress, anxiety, and hopeless-
ness, which draw citizens to leaders who promise to
deliver better times (Hunt, Boal, and Dodge 1999;
Shamir and Howell 1999; but see Pillai and Meindl
1998). Charismatic leaders surface in times of crisis
because they are seen as saviors and are perceived to
have a unique ability to improve a critical situation.6
Ultimately, the intersection of a crisis and certain lead-
ership traits can result in a “charismatic bond,” where
individuals project charisma onto a leader whom they
believe is capable of restoring feelings of efficacy
undermined by the crisis (Madsen and Snow 1991).7
Empirical works support this theoretical perspec-
tive. The rise of populist, charismatic political leaders
often coincides with conditions of crisis (Willner
1984). For example, the phenomena of Fujimorismo in
Peru and Chavismo in Venezuela point to a willingness
among people in crisis situations to focus on and
support charismatic personalities (see Roberts 1995;
Weyland 2003). Charismatic bonding also appears in
an experimental study of the 2003 California Recall
election, in which Bligh, Kohles, and Pillai (2005) find
that the state economic crisis led citizens to rate chal-
lengers to Gray Davis as more charismatic.
Consequences
Extant works suggest that elevated perceptions of a
leader’s charisma have evaluative and behavioral
effects (Conger and Kanungo 1987, 1988). The second
part of our argument is concerned with two effects:
willingness to overlook poor performance and to
self-sacrifice.
First, charismatic leaders should be more likely
than noncharismatic leaders to weather periods of
poor performance or at least avert blame for poor
output in times of crisis. In short, the confidence-
inspiring rhetoric of the charismatic leader and a
desire to sustain his or her savior-like image encour-
ages individuals to resist blaming that leader for bad
policy outcomes (for a discussion and examples in the
realm of organizational theory, see Awamleh and
Gardner 1999). The cases of Perón in Argentina and
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in Bangladesh are empirical
instances where charismatic political leaders man-
aged, at least initially, to deflect blame despite poor
output (see Madsen and Snow 1991 and Khan 1976,
respectively).
Second, followers of charismatic leaders should be
more inclined to engage in self-sacrificial behavior.
The phenomenon of self-sacrificial behavior oriented
toward a charismatic leader and/or that leader’s cause
most likely stems from feelings of oneness with the
leader and/or norms of reciprocity triggered by the
leader’s inspirational actions (Bligh, Kohles, and
Meindl 2004; Choi and Mai-Dalton 1998; Cialdini
et al. 1997; House, Spangler, and Woycke 1991; Kirk-
patrick and Locke 1996; Shamir et al. 1998). Research,
primarily in the field of business organization, sup-
ports the assertion that charismatic leaders are par-
ticularly adept at causing followers “to perform above
and beyond the call of duty” and “make significant
personal sacrifices” (House, Spangler, and Woycke
1991, 364).
While the literature suggests the existence of these
relationships among crises, charisma, and conse-
quences, most studies in this area typically rely on
qualitative evidence, lie outside the confines of politi-
cal science, and/or do not specifically compare crisis to
noncrisis contexts. In order to test these ideas system-
atically within a political context, we implemented an
experimental study just prior to the 2004 U.S. presi-
dential election.
The 2004 Presidential Election as a
Test Case, and Case-Specific
Hypotheses
Our experiment took advantage of the fact that the
2004 presidential election was a context in which per-
ceptions of crisis were both plausible and real. The fact
that the United States was operating under the threat
of crisis was identified often by the media and by
politicians. Numerous news reports suggested Al
Qaeda was planning an attack on the United States in
the period before or near election time.8 Vice President
6Weber (1922, 1947) was perhaps the first to assert this. His argu-
ment is linked to institutional context: inherently charismatic
leaders appear in revolutionary times, when traditional institu-
tions have been undermined and are in flux. Our conception of
charisma is not dependent on institutional context, but could be
conditioned by it.
7In a related but different vein, scholars of terror management
theory posit that in times of crisis people experience heightened
fears of death, which cause them to turn to charismatic leaders
who appear capable of providing protection (for a discussion see
Landau et al. 2004).
8See, for example, the numerous references to terrorists’ plots to
influence the 2004 Presidential election archived at the New York
Times and CNN.com.
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Cheney also issued frequent warnings about terrorists
similar to this one given at a town hall meeting in
Minnesota:
“. . . they’re doing everything they can to find ways to
strike us. . . . And you can imagine what would happen if
we had an al Qaeda cell loose in the middle of one of our
own cities with a nuclear weapon. The devastation that
that would bring down on hundreds of thousands,
maybe millions of Americans, obviously is something
that you don’t want to think about.”9
Still, national security was not the only issue on
citizens’ minds; voters were also concerned about the
economy and the situation in Iraq (Morin and Balz
2004). As a consequence, the context was such that the
salience of the crisis situation was susceptible to
manipulation. The existence of numerous positive
indicators about the economy, health, and the envi-
ronment provided additional information with which
to diminish concerns of a crisis and, instead, make
salient conditions of prosperity and well-being.
Finally, in conditions in which the crisis is exter-
nally provoked, current research suggests that the
incumbent leader is the most likely beneficiary of
heightened perceptions of charisma and their effects.
Consequently, within this context, we focus on the
effect of crisis on evaluations of and behavior toward
the incumbent president, George W. Bush.10
Our experimental study was designed to test the
following hypotheses, which follow from our theoreti-
cal framework. First, under conditions of crisis, people
will perceive Bush as more charismatic (H1). Second,
elevated perceptions of charisma increase tendencies
to overlook poor performance by Bush (H2). Third,
heightened perceptions of charisma increase willing-
ness to engage in self-sacrificial behavior on behalf of
Bush (H3).
We also leave open the possibility that crisis will
have a direct effect on blame attribution and self-
sacrificial behavior. Scholars of presidential approval
have found that during times of crisis citizens increase
their levels of support for the incumbent administra-
tion (e.g., Brody 1991; MacKuen 1983; Mueller 1970,
1973) and this rally “round the flag” effect can pre-
sumably lead to a “halo” effect across domains not
related to the crisis (Bowen 1989).11
Method
To test our hypotheses, we implemented an experi-
mental study just prior to the 2004 U.S. elections. Par-
ticipants in the study were randomly assigned to one
of three groups: Status Quo (control), Good Times (a
treatment designed to diminish concerns of a terrorist
attack), or Crisis (a treatment designed to increase
concerns of a terrorist attack). Following exposure to
the treatments (or no exposure in the case of the
control), subjects were asked a number of evaluative
and behavioral questions concerning the incumbent
candidate, George W. Bush.
Participants and Design
Our computer-based study ran from October 14 to
October 27, 2004. Participants were recruited from
undergraduate political science classes at a large public
university, in exchange for extra credit.12 The average
age of our 299 subjects was 19.89 years, 52% of whom
were female and 56% of whom identified as Demo-
crat; with respect to race/ethnicity, 42% self-identified
as white, 34% as Asian, 12% as Hispanic, and the
remainder as black or other.13
Subjects were randomly assigned to the Good
Times (n = 102), Status Quo(control) (n = 103), and
Crisis (n = 94) groups. Difference of means tests on
basic demographic and dispositional indicators
revealed that the only significant difference among the
three groups with respect to these variables is a slight
underrepresentation of female subjects in the Good
Times condition, compared to the other two. We also
compared these same statistics to values in the 2004
9Vice President’s Remarks at a Town Hall Meeting in Minnesota,
August 6, 2004. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2004/08/20040806-15.html. Accessed August 24, 2004.
10If, as was not likely to be the case in our study, the incumbent is
perceived as the cause of the crisis, then citizens will likely project
charisma onto challengers (see for example Bligh, Kohles, and
Pillai 2005). The literature on rally effects demonstrates that
incumbents receive a boost in approval, across many issue
domains, when there is a dramatic foreign policy event (e.g.,
Bowen 1989; Mueller 1970, 1973). Consistent with our decision to
focus on Bush, throughout the 2004 campaign, polls showed that
the public perceived Bush (as opposed to Kerry) as a strong leader
(Morin and Balz 2004). Further, in analyses not reported here, we
found that our treatments did not result in higher perceptions of
Kerry as a charismatic leader. Similarly, Landau et al. (2004) also
found that reminders of 9/11 increased the appeal of George W.
Bush, but did not have a similar effect for John Kerry.
11In a related vein, scholars have found a direct effect of orange
alerts (Willer 2004) and perceptions of terrorist threat (Huddy
et al. 2005) on presidential approval (though see Davis and Silver
2004 for more nuanced results).
12Student subjects are a convenient population and previous
studies in this research domain have obtained compelling results
with similar subject pools (e.g., Hunt, Boal, and Dodge 1999;
Kirkpatrick and Locke 1996; Landau et al. 2004).
13See Web Appendix B for these and related statistics for the entire
sample and by condition (http://www.journalofpolitics.org).
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National Election Study. Compared to this more
general sample, our student sample is younger, some-
what more interested in the campaign, more Demo-
cratic, and has a higher proportion of Asians and
Hispanics and fewer whites.14 Some of these differ-
ences are not unexpected; for example, Funk (1997)
also finds that her student sample is more informed
than a national sample. While these differences should
be kept in mind when drawing generalizations from
our study, we do not expect them to adversely affect
our hypothesis tests; in fact, a more informed and
more left-leaning sample provides us with a more
stringent test of our hypotheses, assuming that it is
more difficult to evoke evaluative and behavioral
changes from the better informed and that Democrats
should be less willing to project additional charisma
onto a Republican leader.
Procedures
Subjects reported to the experimental lab in order to
participate in a study about “current events.” Once
seated, individually, in front of a computer terminal,
the program randomly assigned participants to either
the Status Quo (control) group, or one of two treat-
ment groups. After a research assistant initiated the
program, the subjects were asked some basic sociode-
mographic questions and their party identification. If
assigned to the Good Times or Crisis condition, these
questions were followed by instructions to put on
headphones and watch a short presentation. After
viewing the treatments (or not for those in the Status
Quo condition, which proceeded immediately to the
next set of questions), subjects completed a short
survey, which included questions designed to allow for
a manipulation check and questions tapping evalua-
tions of George W. Bush and political behavior rel-
evant to the campaign and election.
Treatment/Independent Variables
Subjects in the Crisis and Good Times conditions were
presented with audiovisual treatments of about one
minute and a half in length. The Crisis treatment
sought to make the possibility of another terrorist
attack salient in the subject’s mind, to the extent that it
was not already made so by the general election
context. Thus, the treatment contained frightening
images and information regarding security issues, and
included statements such as “. . . the CIA is warning
Americans that al Qaeda has people in the United
States on the verge of mounting a large-scale terrorist
attack.” The Good Times treatment exposed subjects to
happy images and positive information about the state
of the United States and its citizens. Our voiceover
noted that “overall, more Americans report in surveys
that they are healthier and happier than ever before”
and made a number of other similar upbeat state-
ments about life in the United States. In short, we
sought to induce subjects not to think about pending
national threats.
The audiovisual presentations were modeled after
media clips commonly found on news websites, which
combine a slideshow of images with a voiceover. The
text for the narration was drawn mostly from news
and political reports and was edited together by the
authors; the images were taken primarily from news
archives and assembled by our graduate student com-
puter programmer. In some cases we added text boxes
with quotes (which were read within the narration).
The voiceover was done by a male professional voice
actor. Though only a brief summary of the treatments
is offered here, we invite the reader to view the com-
plete texts of both treatments and especially the visual
images used in our Web Appendix A.
Mediating and Dependent Variables
Perceptions of Charisma. In order to measure the
degree to which respondents perceived Bush as char-
ismatic, we asked respondents to evaluate Bush on a
battery of items from the Multifactor Leadership
Questionnaire (MLQ-5X Long Form; Bass and Avolio
199515). This questionnaire is widely used in studies of
leadership (Awamleh and Gardner 1999; Tejeda,
Scandura, and Pillai 2001) to differentiate between
different types of leaders, and research has demon-
strated its validity across contexts (Bass and Avolio
1993, 1995; see also Table 1 in Antonakis, Avolio, and
Sivasubramaniam 2003). We included the three batter-
ies (12 statements) related to perceptions of charisma:
Attributed Charisma, Idealized Influence, and Inspira-
tional Motivation. Subjects were asked to indicate the
extent to which they agreed (on a 6-point scale) with
each of the statements, as they pertained to George W.
Bush. The statements capture the degree to which
individuals perceive the target to possess the traits that
are considered to underlie the latent concept of
charisma. The trigger words used in the battery are the
following: vision, pride, goes beyond self-interest,
14See Web Appendix B for a table on which these assessments were
made.
15We purchased the survey instrument from Mind Garden, Inc.
(http://www.mindgarden.com).
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respect, power, values and beliefs, sense of purpose,
moral and ethical, sense of mission, optimistic, enthu-
siastic, and confidence.16 We combined responses to
the 12 statements into an additive index, which was
then recoded to run from one indicating the lowest
perception of charisma to six indicating the highest
perception of charisma. The Perceptions of Charisma
combined scale shows very good reliability (Cron-
bach’s a = .93), giving us further confidence that these
traits tap a single underlying dimension.17 The mean
value on the variable (and standard deviation) is 3.62
(1.12), and the distribution is normal.
Blame Attribution. To measure willingness to over-
look poor performance, we asked respondents about
Bush’s responsibility for U.S. failures in Iraq. Respon-
dents were first reminded that “Recent reports from
the Senate intelligence committee indicate that the
CIA provided faulty information on the presence of
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, which was one of
Bush’s main justifications for the war.” The variable,
Blame Attribution, is based on responses to the
follow-up question, in which respondents indicated,
on a scale of 1 to 5, to what extent they believe Bush is
to blame for U.S. failures in Iraq. The mean value on
the variable (and standard deviation) is 3.97 (1.10),
and the distribution is slightly skewed toward higher
values.
Self-Sacrifice. To measure willingness to engage in
self-sacrificial behavior, we asked respondents to indi-
cate how many of four campaign-related activities
(make phone calls to get out the vote; attend a rally;
drive this candidate’s supporters to the polls; and, con-
tribute money to the campaign) they were willing to
engage in on behalf of George W. Bush.18 To check our
assumption that these acts tap a similar construct
related to self-sacrifice, we performed principal factors
analysis on the set of four responses (yes/no to each
act). The analysis produced a single factor with an
eigenvalue over 1.0 (the Cronbach’s a for the four
items is .78). The additive Self-Sacrifice variable ranges
from zero to four acts. The mean value on the variable
(and standard deviation) is .57 (1.06), and the distri-
bution is skewed toward 0, the modal value.
Party Identification. We also measured respon-
dents’ party identification with a branching question
similar to the one used in the National Election Study.
Scholars have argued that partisan identification
serves as a “perceptual screen” for incoming informa-
tion (e.g., Bartels 2002; Campbell et al. 1960; Zaller
1992), making individuals more likely to accept infor-
mation that is consistent with their identification and
reject information that is inconsistent. The implica-
tion of this argument is that, in addition to different
initial baselines, the slope of the effect of new infor-
mation on behavior might not be the same across
partisan groups.19 We created dummy variables for
those who self-identified as Democrats, Republicans,
and Independents.20 In each of our analyses we tested
whether the effect of the Crisis treatment on the
dependent variables was more pronounced among
Republicans compared to Democrats.
Context and Manipulation Checks
Subjects in our study were all being exposed (though
of course to varying degrees) to the electoral context of
the 2004 election. To verify our contention that mul-
tiple issues were present in the information environ-
ment during our study, we had two research assistants,
blind to our hypotheses, code the issues that were
addressed in articles on the front page of the New York
Times two weeks prior to and throughout the study.21
Our subjects expressed fairly high levels of interest in
the campaign (see Table B2, Web Appendix B), and,
therefore we are reasonably confident that they were
aware of the overall information environment. Most
of the stories, 5.66%, concerned other domestic issues
(e.g., campaign news, health care, the environment),
38.16% were about foreign policy (e.g., Iraq, Israel,
treaties), 7.89% were related to homeland security
(e.g., airport security, 9/11), and the remaining 3.29%
were about the economy.22 In short, the “status quo”
16These were presented in statements such as “articulates a com-
pelling vision of the future” and “displays a sense of power and
confidence.”
17An alternative would be to use factor analysis; we did this using
principal components factor analysis and the resulting factor cor-
relates at .999 with our additive index.
18Expressed willingness could differ from actual behavior, which is
not captured here.
19Including partisanship measures in our multiple variable analy-
ses also allows us to control for the fact that Democrats are over-
represented in our subject sample.
20We use dummy variables rather than a 7-point partisanship vari-
able in order to avoid issues of intransitivities (see Petrocik 1974)
and because they elicit long-term identifications (see Miller 1991).
However, the results are similar if the 7-point scale is used.
21Scholars argue that local/state newspapers take cues from elite
newspapers (e.g., Crouse 1973), and this is more pronounced for
coverage of presidential races (Shaw and Sparrow 1999). Thus,
even if students were reading a different newspaper, the informa-
tion environment should have been similar to the New York Times.
22Intercoder reliability for a randomly selected week of the study
was .82 for the type of issue addressed in each article.
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individual was being exposed to multiple issues, of
which homeland security was one part.
To test the performance of our treatment stimuli,
we asked respondents to indicate how worried they felt
that there would be terrorist attacks in the United
States in the near future; subjects responded on a
4-point scale where 4 indicated very worried. We
expected that those who received the Good Times
treatment on average would be least worried; those in
the Crisis treatment would be most worried; and,
those in the Status Quo group would fall in between,
given that those who entered our labs were already
primed by the real election context discussed above.23
Figure 1 shows the mean response to this question, by
group. Difference of means tests of all pair-wise com-
parisons, assuming unequal variance for a strict test,
are significant at p < .05, one-tailed.24 In sum, these
results show that the treatments did have the intended
effects on respondents, increasing concerns of a ter-
rorist attack among those who viewed the Crisis treat-
ment and decreasing them among those exposed to
the Good Times treatment.
Results
Our first hypothesis is that those in the Crisis condi-
tion will perceive George W. Bush as more charis-
matic. The dependent variable is our perceptions of
charisma scale. In addition to dummy variables for the
Crisis and Status Quo conditions (the baseline is Good
Times), we include a dummy variable for female to
control for an underrepresentation of females in the
Good Times treatment and dummy variables for
Democrats and Republicans (the baseline is Indepen-
dents) to control for the critical role of partisanship.
The results in the first data column of Table 1
provide clear support for our principal hypothesis. As
expected, those in the Crisis treatment were more
likely to rate Bush higher on the charisma scale, com-
pared to those in the Good Times treatment, and the
effect is significant at p < .10 (one-tailed). Given the
short duration of our treatment in the lab setting,
the coefficient on the crisis variable (.184) is substan-
tively quite meaningful. Even in a context where a
crisis is looming and not yet realized, individuals
project charisma onto likely leaders.
We also, as expected, find differences in baseline
perceptions of Bush’s charisma by partisanship, with
Republicans rating Bush as more charismatic and
Democrats rating Bush as less charismatic, compared
to the Independent baseline. Interestingly, however, we
did not find that partisanship moderates the effect of
crisis. We tested an alternate model with interactions
between the two conditions and the two party dummy
variables and the inclusion of these interaction terms
did not enhance our baseline model, according to an
f-test, nor were any of the interaction terms signifi-
cant. Thus, we find that the effect of crisis on per-
ceptions of charisma is not conditional on party
identification. While different partisans may start with
different baselines, all project additional charisma
onto Bush given certain contextual conditions.
With support for our first hypothesis, we now turn
to testing the behavioral consequences of perceptions
of charisma. Our second hypothesis is that heightened
perceptions of charisma will make people more
willing to overlook poor performance by George W.
Bush. The independent variables we include are the
perceptions of charisma scale, and the dummy vari-
ables for the Crisis and Status Quo conditions, parti-
23An alternative manipulation approach would be to compare a
pre-test and post-test worry question. However, since we con-
ducted the study in a single session, a pre-test question might
prime subjects in the Status Quo and Good Times conditions
to be worried, which would influence their subsequent survey
responses. Consequently, we only included a pre-test worry ques-
tion for those exposed to the Crisis treatment; a differences of
means test on these pre- and post-values shows the treatment
resulted in a significant increase in worry (p < .10).
24Given the unidirectional nature of the hypotheses (Crisis > Status
Quo > Good Times), one-tailed hypothesis tests are appropriate
(see Hanushek and Jackson 1977, 68–69).
FIGURE 1 Worried About a Terrorist Attack, by
Condition
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2
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The standard deviations (shown as whiskers) for the three mean
values are as follows: Good Times, .741; Status Quo, .813; Crisis,
.771. All pair-wise comparisons are significant at p < .05,
one-tailed.
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sanship, and female. Given that the dependent variable
is comprised of a 5-point scale, we use ordered probit
analysis.
The results, shown in the second data column of
Table 1, support our hypothesis. Perceptions of Bush
as a charismatic leader are clearly related to willingness
to overlook poor performance—the negative sign on
the coefficient indicates that perceptions of charisma
decrease tendencies to blame Bush for failures in Iraq.
The results also show direct effects of the conditions,
with the Crisis and Status Quo variables statistically
significant and in the expected direction, and with the
effect more pronounced for the former.25 Finally,
Republicans are significantly less likely to blame Bush
for poor performance in Iraq, as expected, while there
are no differences between Democrats and Indepen-
dents. We again tested for and did not find that parti-
sanship moderated the effects of the conditions;
because these interaction terms did not enhance the
model, we continue to omit them.
Since the coefficients from an ordered probit
analysis are not directly interpretable, we calculate the
substantive effects using Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wit-
tenberg 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2001). In
Figure 2, we present the probability of falling into the
highest blame category (5) at different levels of per-
ceptions of charisma by partisanship for those in the
Crisis and Good Times conditions. The figure clearly
shows that, as perceptions of charisma increase,
25We cannot directly calculate the combined effect of crisis because
the first model uses OLS while the second uses ordered probit.
However, we did estimate the ordered probit model with and
without the moderator of perceptions of charisma. Once we added
the moderator of charisma, the size of the effect of crisis dropped
and the pseudo-R squared increased. As another approximation,
we ran the second dependent variable using OLS, and the same
variables were significant. In this model, the direct effect of crisis
was -.278, while the indirect effect through perceptions of cha-
risma was -.077, for a combined effect of -.355.
TABLE 1 Determinants of Perceptions of Bush as a Charismatic Leader (OLS Regression Results), Blame
Attribution (Ordered Probit Results), and Self-Sacrificial Behavior (Ordered Probit Results)
Perceptions of Charisma Blame Attribution Self-Sacrifice
Perceptions of Charisma — -.663
(.084)*
.873
(.118)*
Crisis Condition .184
(.131)*
-.410
(.164)*
.362
(.215)*
Status Quo Condition .059
(.128)
-.325
(.166)*
.589
(.211)*
Democrat -.180
(.132)*
.057
(.171)
-.251
(.229)
Republican 1.485
(.160)*
-.996
(.228)*
.777
(.257)*
Female -.087
(.108)
-.096
(.135)
.040
(.171)
Constant 3.385
(.135)*
— —
Cut 1 -5.728
(.442)
4.323
(.519)
Cut 2 -4.604
(.400)
5.204
(.558)
Cut 3 -3.855
(.376)
5.885
(.589)
Cut 4 -2.468
(.345)
6.657
(.615)
N 299 299 299
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 .34 .23 .32
F/Likelihood Ratio 31.40 181.32 187.37
Prob > F/Prob > Chi(2) .000 .000 .000
*p < .10, one-tailed. Numbers in cells are coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. We use OLS analysis when the dependent
variable is continuous (perceptions of charisma) and ordered probit analysis when the dependent variable is based on a 5-point scale
(blame attribution and self-sacrificial behavior).
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subjects become much less likely to fall into this
highest blame category, across conditions and partisan
groups. As expected, we also find different baselines by
partisan group, with Republicans being less likely to
fall into the highest blame category at each level of
charisma, compared to Democrats in that same cat-
egory. However, we also see that in some cases Demo-
crats are less likely to blame Bush than Republicans.
For example, Democrats in the Crisis condition at
higher levels of charisma are less likely to blame Bush
compared to Republicans in the same condition at
lower values.26 Finally, we also see differences by con-
dition, with Democrats and Republicans in the Crisis
condition less likely to blame Bush at each level of
charisma, compared to their counterparts in the Good
Times condition.
We now turn to our final hypothesis, which con-
cerns willingness to self-sacrifice. To refresh, we expect
that heightened perceptions of charisma should make
individuals more likely to engage in self-sacrificial
behavior. We include the same independent variables
as we used in the previous analysis. We expect positive
signs on the coefficients given that the dependent vari-
able is coded such that higher values mean more acts
for Bush. The results are presented in the third data
column of Table 1. Once again, we omit partisanship-
condition interactions because, when tested for, they
did not enhance the model.
In the case of self-sacrifice, the perceptions of
charisma scale is positive and significant. Thus, per-
ceptions of charisma, magnified by crisis conditions,
affect willingness to contribute one’s own resources
to the leader’s cause. We also find significant direct
effects for the Crisis and Status Quo conditions, and
in the expected direction, though this time the latter
exerts a more substantial effect.27 Finally, we find a
significant effect for Republicans, but no difference
between Democrats and Independents.28
We again calculated the substantive effects and, to
illustrate some of the effects of the variables, Figure 3
shows the probability of falling into the lowest cat-
egory of self-sacrifice (0) at different levels of percep-
tions of charisma, by partisanship for those in the
Crisis and Good Times conditions. We find similar
results to the previous figure in that, as perceptions of
charisma increase, subjects become much less likely to
fall into this category. Further, the probabilities are
26Of course, not many Democrats are predisposed to view Bush as
highly charismatic; yet, in our sample, about 15% of Democrats
gave Bush ratings of four or over on the perceptions of charisma
scale.
27We again could not calculate the combined effect of crisis. Once
we added the moderator of charisma, the size of the effect of crisis
dropped and the pseudo-R squared increased, as with blame attri-
bution. When we ran the model using OLS, the same variables
were significant. In this model, the direct effect of crisis was .163,
while the indirect effect through perceptions of charisma was .071,
for a combined effect of .234.
28As a final exercise, we also ran our models with a measure that
asks the traditional NES question, how well the adjective “strong
leader” describes George W. Bush in place of the charisma scale.
This variable had a significant effect on our blame and self-
sacrifice variables. However, the substantive effect of the charisma
scale for each dependent variable was about two times larger than
the effects with the “strong leader” measure. These results (avail-
able in Web Appendix B) support our argument that different
leadership types produce distinct consequences.
FIGURE 2 Probability of Strongly Blaming Bush at Different Levels of Perceptions of Bush’s Charisma, by
Partisanship and Condition
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lower for Republicans and those in the Crisis condi-
tion, across each level of charisma. All groups cluster
in the 90% range at very low levels of charisma (1 and
2). We then see a substantial decline in the probabili-
ties and more differentiation across groups in the mid-
range of the charisma scale. At the highest levels of
perceived charisma, the four groups begin to move
closer together again as they become more willing to
self-sacrifice for Bush.
Discussion and Conclusion
Our data and analyses support our hypotheses that
crisis conditions magnify perceptions of charisma
(with respect to a likely candidate) and these, in turn,
have politically relevant evaluative and behavioral
effects, compared to normal or “better” times. People
perceive certain political leaders, in this case George
W. Bush, to be more charismatic in times of crisis.
Crises then have indirect—through perceptions of
charisma—and direct effects on individuals’ will-
ingness to forgive policy mistakes and to engage in
self-sacrifice.
These results have important implications for
political scientists. For example, scholars debate two
mechanisms that lead to rally and related effects:
patriotism (e.g., Mueller 1970, 1973) and decreased
criticism on the part of elites (Brody 1991). Our
study suggests a third, noncompeting explanation—
heightened perceptions of charisma. The relationships
between crises and charisma may also help explain the
duration of the rally. When the crisis or threat recedes,
there is no longer a basis from which the leader can
enhance his charisma, and so the rally ends.
Overall, and most important from our perspec-
tive, the results have important implications for
understanding the potential dangers that can occur
in a democracy during times of crisis. Our results
suggest that during times of crisis, individuals look
for a strong, confident leader, and they project addi-
tional power, morality, and competence onto that
individual. They further become more willing to
overlook policy mistakes and to volunteer their per-
sonal resources for the leader’s purpose. These effects
did not only obtain for partisans of the president;
rather, they occurred across all partisan groups and
there were certain circumstances under which Demo-
crats were less likely to blame Bush for policy mis-
takes than Republicans (who viewed Bush at lower
levels of charisma). Furthermore, the effects of
charisma were often stronger than those of one’s
partisan identification, one of the most stable
predispositions. These findings help explain both the
allure and the “Teflon” nature of leaders who come to
power in times of crisis.
In our study, a crisis was only a looming threat,
and one that subjects were reminded of by way of a
minute and a half presentation. The charismatic bond
that we invoked in our subjects is likely just a small
representation of a much greater bond that can be
established in such contexts. Citizens around the
world often find themselves in the midst of grave
crises, which daily realities and the media make salient
for days and months on end. Our work suggests that
calculating politicians can and do benefit from such
FIGURE 3 Probability of Not Engaging in Self-Sacrifice for Bush at Different Levels of Perceptions of
Bush’s Charisma, by Partisanship and Condition
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situations. One does not have to search far for an
example of a politician cultivating crisis in order to
enhance his appeal. During the 2004 campaign that is
the focus of this study, the Bush team strategically ran
ads designed to remind individuals of 9/11, and his
vice presidential candidate worked hard to remind
citizens of what Cheney ironically stated were things
“you don’t want to think about.”
If crisis situations cause citizens to put greater
trust in more charismatic leaders, then those leaders
may also be able to use these situations to increase
their institutional power and to enact otherwise
unpopular policies. We need only look at the contro-
versy over the domestic spying program, cleverly rela-
beled the “terrorist surveillance” program by the
administration, for an example. In January 2006, a
majority of the public supported the president’s
authority to wiretap without warrants when framed
with the words “in order to reduce the threat of ter-
rorism” (Nagourney and Elder 2006). Put simply, the
intersection of crises and charisma may have even
deeper political consequences than we have presented
here.
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